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 1 
 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
At the close of the twentieth century, the main challenge faced by peace policy is 
that of ethnopolitical conflict. Contrary to the optimistic expectations of many 
theoreticians of modernization, ethnicity has lost none of its importance as a 
defining characteristic of what Germans call Schicksalsgemeinschaften — co-
llectivities forged by some common destiny. Indeed, in the crises of transformation 
that have occurred since the dissipation of the East-West conflict, parties amongst 
whom violent disputes are taking place, or threaten to take place, are making 
increased use of the argument about ethnic membership to mobilize their 
adherents. Some of these disputes have long histories, in the course of which the 
relations between the parties have become charged with a host of conflictual 
factors — from clashes of interest and disputes over resources, through one-sided 
or multi-sided experiences of domination and violence, up to an including 
ideological differences and dissension over values and beliefs. Typical examples are 
the protracted conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus, or between the Israelis and 
Palestinians.1 
The opposition between the ethnically defined parties frequently appears so 
all-embracing and thoroughgoing that it seems impossible for the conflict to be de-
escalated without the participation of actors not involved in it. These latter have 
come to be known by the term third parties . Third parties can be either 
governmental/non-governmental institutions or single individuals/groups of 
individuals who are not involved, at least directly, in the conflict.2 Where agreement 
                                                          
1. On the whole topic of ethnopolitical conflict (with details of further literature), see Christian P. 
Scherrer: Ethno-Nationalismus im Weltsystem: Prävention, Konfliktbearbeitung und die Rolle der 
internationalen Gemeinschaft (Münster, 1996).  
2. On the terminology, see Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Dean G. Pruitt, and Sang Hee Kim: Social Conflict, 
Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2nd ed. (New York et al., 1994), 196–223.  
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is lacking, however, is in regard to the precise roles and functions these third 
parties should assume in order to have a truly peace-making effect. 
This question will be examined more closely in what follows here. I shall start 
by clarifying the key concepts and classifying the various kinds of third-party 
intervention. Two ideal-typical forms of intervention will then be contrasted: 
primarily content-oriented mediation procedures , and primarily relational 
consultation procedures . Both procedures seek to influence an acute conflict 
over the short or medium term. What chance there is of transforming the particular 
conflict in a long-term way, of establishing lasting peace, is a question which can, in 
contrast, only be clarified by also looking at the framework conditions and macro-
structure of the conflict. Taking these factors into account leads to a substantially 
broader understanding of constructive roles and functions in the context of 
ethnopolitical conflicts than would emerge from too simplistic a view of ›the third 
party‹. 
Ethnopolit ical  is here taken to refer to those conflicts in which involve-
ment as a party to the conflict results, for the actors from one side at least, from 
ethnic (or linguistic or religious) differences. This description does not imply that it 
is ethnicity as such which constitutes the conflict; ethnicity merely constitutes one 
special, albeit highly influential, form of socialization. Only when ethnic 
membership is mobilized for political purposes, particularly in times of social 
unrest, where a (re)distribution of existential options is at stake, does it become a 
key feature of the disputants’ self-image. 
Alongside the traditional concept of overall confl ict  resolution , an 
increasingly prominent role has been played in recent years by the pragmatic 
confl ict  management  approach, inspired to a great extent by the various US-
imported ›human relations‹ movements in organization theory, and by humanistic 
psychology in psycho-social and educational work. Where recalcitrant ethnopolitical 
conflicts are involved, the first concept turns out to be too ambitious, the second 
suitable for use only in acute crises or in relation to concrete individual agreements 
founded on some kind of basic understanding. The concept of confl ict  trans-
formation  highlights the need for a long-term perspective; and the German term 
Konfl iktbearbeitung  (treatment or processing of a conflict) implies the 
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involvement of external actors and the expediency of approaches based on a 
division of labour. 
The qualification of conflict management as constructive  points to two 
features. First, the crucial feature is the outcome  of the particular conflictual 
behaviour or conflict intervention. Have these been successful in preventing or 
ending violence, or in attaining other goals considered relevant to peace — e.g. 
social justice or cross-party loyalties and institutions? Whether a piece of behaviour 
or an intervention has been constructive in this sense can, of course, only ever be 
established ex post facto; and whether it was this particular  piece of 
behaviour or this particular  intervention that was decisive can, in view of the 
complexity of social processes, only be demonstrated in approximate fashion. 
However, a piece of behaviour or an intervention can also be rated as 
constructive on process-related grounds . If one works on the premise that a 
successful instance of conflict management always also entails learning processes 
that lead to a broadening of perspectives and to increasing mutual understanding 
on the part of those involved, then the crucial feature is the presence of indicators 
of these kinds of constructive learning-processes: agreement on the definition of 
the conflict, or at least a willingness to ›agree to disagree‹ (which, in the case of 
ethnopolitical disputes, is one of the very first hurdles); signs that differences in 
standpoints are acknowledged as legitimate; a willingness to come to a mutual 
understanding on procedures for dealing with the conflict.3 
The concept of conflict management by third parties  often has associated 
with it the idea of equidistance to the parties in dispute. In an ideal situation—
according to a widespread notion based on the concept of ›mediation‹ (see below) 
— third parties should, if possible, fulfil two criteria: they should, firstly, be 
neutral,  i.e. not biased as a result of previous links with any of the parties; and 
secondly, they should be impartial , i.e. not show preference for any one of the 
positions held by the parties in the particular dispute. But precisely in the context of 
ethnopolitical conflicts, with their many gradations of partiality and their diverse 
                                                          
3. On this, see the similar distinction in Eva Maringer and Reiner Steinweg: Konstruktive Haltungen 
und Verhaltensweisen im Konflikt: Begriffe und Erfahrungen, (Berghof Report 3, forthcoming). 
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external actors, each with their own, highly partial interests, one has to ask whether 
these requirements are realistic in relation to actual persons (groups of persons) 
and institutions, and whether they are helpful as regards the actual matter in hand. 
It would seem more sensible to interpret the concept of the third party as an ideal-
typical  form  to which real actors attain to a greater or lesser extent, depending on 
their own particular interests and their position in the nexus of conflictual events. 
Whatever the case, one precondition is that they should have the intention of 
playing a de-escalatory, regulatory, and mediating role between the parties to the 
conflict.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4. Johan Galtung points out that third-party terminology may foster polarization in conflicts, and that it 
would therefore be better to talk of N&1 par t ie s  — or, better still, of ›go-betweens‹ — in order to 
highlight the aspect of outside influence and the fact that the external actors have their own 
interests. These suggestions are worth considering, but will probably not have any impact on the 
now-established third-party terminology. See Johan Galtung: The Role of the third party, in Jörg 
Calließ and Christine M. Merkel (eds.): Peaceful Settlement of Conflict — A Task for Civil Society: 
Third Party Intervention, (Loccumer Protokolle, 9/94; Rehburg-Loccum, 1995), 368–77. 
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1 Third Parties between ›Good Offices‹ and ›Power 
Mediation‹ 
 
 
 
 
Depending on the position and function of the third party vis-à-vis  the disputants, 
various ideal-typical forms can, in their turn, be identified. One very common type of 
differentiation is based on the third party’s options for intervention. According to 
this, the following basic forms can be distinguished — beginning with the weakest 
type of involvement: 
 
Good offices: This essentially involves promoting and supporting the direct 
treatment of the conflict by the parties in dispute. It includes, at a specific level, the 
provision of communications facilities, transport, and accommodation, and the 
creation of opportunities for direct encounter. At the more general level, this 
category can be regarded as covering all the measures that help the disputants 
arrive at a constructive resolution of the conflict without the third party’s directly 
assuming a facilitating or negotiating function. This includes, first and foremost, 
training the negotiators in methods that offer ›win‹ opportunities for both sides; it 
also includes shuttle diplomacy. 
 
Faci l i tation and mediation : As soon as the third party assumes a 
decisive role in directing the conflict-resolution procedure — something that is 
possible even within shuttle diplomacy — the bounds to negotiation are over-
stepped. The decisive precondition here is, of course, that the parties in dispute 
should be prepared, in the first place, to agree to this type of negotiation. A whole 
range of schools with non-uniform terminology now exist in this area. It would 
therefore seem to me to be sensible to apply the term ›mediation‹ (in the narrower 
sense) to all those methods of negotiation in which the third party takes charge of 
directing the process of confl ict  management  but responsibility for dealing 
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with the content of the confl ict  remains with the parties in dispute. Weaker 
forms of negotiation, where there is no consistent leadership-role but there is 
emphasis on the procedural side of the conflict management could be described as 
›facilitation‹. 
 
Formal and informal arbitration/Lit igation:  In these classic rule-of-
law methods of dispute settlement, the third party assumes responsibility not only 
for the procedure, but also for the material settlement of the conflict. It makes its 
decision on the basis of superordinate legal principles and norms, and it determines 
winners and losers, or the nature of the compromise reached. The specific differ-
ences between the individual procedures lie in whether the third party is also able 
to enforce its decisions, or whether it is dependent on the assent of the actors 
involved in the conflict. 
 
Power mediation : Here too, the decision about the outcome of the conflict 
lies with the third party. But the latter makes its decision not on the basis of legal 
principles and norms but on the basis of its own interests and on the basis of 
whether it also has the means to enforce its decision. 
In the reality of ethnopolitical conflict management, these four basic forms of 
third party are often combined with one another. A perfect example of this is the 
peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina negotiated in Dayton in December 1995.5 
A decisive factor in bringing about the agreement was the pressure of the US and 
the readiness of the third parties essentially to accept the outcome of the war — 
namely, the de facto  division of the country. However, there were also elements of 
the use of legal principles and norms (e.g. in the declared resolve to punish war 
criminals and establish an internationally supervised human-rights regime) and of 
good offices (e.g. in the clarification of various contentious issues between Croatia 
and the (rump) Yugoslavian federation). 
Empirical research into the role of third parties has sought, amongst other 
things, to determine which of these forms of intervention may be regarded as 
                                                          
5. U.S. Dept. of State: The Dayton Peace Agreement: Official Texts, (Washington DC, 1995). 
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particularly successful and promising.6 The form that came out best was power 
mediation, particularly where the third parties had sufficient resources, adequate 
legitimacy, and marked interests of their own in settling the conflict. Other factors 
identified as favourable to the course of the conflict were: that the disputants and 
the third party should belong to the same cultural system or be involved in a 
common web of relations; that there should be internal homogeneity amongst the 
actors; that the power relations should be symmetrical; that the conflict should not 
have gone on for too long; and that the issues of ›national security‹ and 
›sovereignty‹ should have as low a profile as possible. 
The indicators of success in these comparative studies cannot be equated 
with lasting peace-making, but no one would probably dispute the fact that in the 
conflicts that were investigated — most of which were highly escalated and violent 
in nature — the crucial factors in securing de-escalation were: mobilization of 
resources, the application of pressure, and the involvement of the responsible 
actors in binding negotiations. Of course, these findings are not automatically 
applicable to preventive peace-work. Moreover, the factors identified by empirical 
analysis as conducive to the management of a conflict are precisely those which are 
missing in recalcitrant ethnopolitical conflicts. Most of these conflicts are 
characterized by an asymmetrical distribution of power, cultural differences, 
internal heterogeneity, and deep social divisions. And last but not least, issues of 
national security and sovereignty are key factors in such conflicts. It is therefore 
advisable, when seeking to improve ethnopolitical conflict management, to keep 
the whole range of third-party interventions in view. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6. See the summary in Jacob Bercovitch: Mediation in der Staatenwelt: Bedingungen für Erfolg oder 
Scheitern internationaler Vermittlungsbemühungen, in Norbert Ropers and Tobias Debiel (eds.): 
Friedliche Konfliktbe-arbeitung in der Staaten- und Gesellschaftswelt (Bonn, 1995), 89–111; see also 
Peter Billing: Eskalation und Deeskalation internationaler Konflikte: Ein Konfliktmodell auf der 
Grundlage der Auswertung von 288 internationalen Kriegen seit 1945, (Bern et al., 1992).  
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2 Ethnopolitical Conflict Management as a Solution to 
Material Disputes and as a Means of Improving Inter-
ethnic Relations 
 
 
 
 
Among the various approaches to negotiation in the narrower sense (mediation and 
facilitation), two in particular have emerged strongly over the last two decades in 
relation to ethnopolitical conflicts: mediation procedures geared to the matter at 
issue, and consultation procedures geared to relations between the parties.7 Both 
approaches are concerned with establishing face-to-face interaction and 
communication between leading or (potentially) influential representatives of the 
parties to the conflict. The essential difference between the two procedures lies in 
the fact that mediation , is meant, if possible, to end in a concrete agreement 
about how to regulate a previously precisely defined contentious issue — e.g. an 
agreement about erecting dual-language place-name signs in bi-ethnic localities. 
The aim of consultation , on the other hand, is at one and the same time more 
modest and more ambitious: namely, to improve relations between the 
representatives of different ethnic groups. In the example with the place-name 
signs, the goal might be to increase both sides’ understanding of why  the other 
side is making/rejecting this demand. 
The need, in ethnopolitical conflicts, to work not only on the contentious 
material issues but also on relations between the parties results from the fact that 
disputes — or lengthy ones, at least — typically operate at two levels: the more or 
less openly negotiated level of political demands and interests, and the deeper 
level of collective experiences, stances, and attitudes integral to the formation of 
                                                          
7. For a more detailed treatment of these approaches, see Norbert Ropers: Peaceful Intervention: 
Structures, Processes, and Strategies for the Constructive Regulation of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, 
(Berghof Report 1; Berlin, 1995).  
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identity. An important role in constituting and shaping these two levels is played by 
events in which large numbers of the members of a group have been the victims of 
despotic rule, expulsion, military conquest, or some other form of violence. A whole 
series of these kinds of collective violations are frequently present in the 
consciousness of ethnic Schicksalsgemeinschaften , and are handed down, or 
deliberately kept alive, from generation to generation. 
If, in such instances, conflict management is confined solely to the 
negotiating level and to an apparently ›reasonable‹ balance of interests, there will 
be a danger that the neglected ›deep dimension‹ of collective experiences, traumas, 
and attitudes will manifest itself as an inexplicable ›irrational‹ derangement. A sign 
of this is the way in which, in negotiations that are apparently proceeding in a 
practical and constructive manner, refractoriness and defensive reactions will 
surface in an abrupt way. Such responses occur particularly in those phases in 
which a political settlement is beginning to take shape but the social consensus 
about this settlement is still very fragile — as, for example, in Northern Ireland or in 
Israel/Palestine in 1995-96. 
Typical examples of mediation procedures geared to the matter at issue are 
official negotiations involving legitimated representatives of the parties in dispute, 
under the direction of an individual or group of individuals enjoying a particular 
degree of authority or acceptance on account of their position or mandate. These 
may include diplomats, elder statespersons, representatives of churches, officials 
appointed by the UN secretary-general, members of OSCE long-term missions, and 
so on. Quite often, however, the trilateral talks only take place after the chances of 
agreement have been sounded out bilaterally, or after a ›pre-mediation‹ session 
with representatives of the lower echelons of leadership. This process may go on for 
quite a time — possibly several years — and makes no sense unless one also 
considers the parallel attempts of the parties to the conflict to achieve their goals 
with means other than bi- and trilateral talks. A crucial factor in assuring success is 
that the disputants’ definition of their interests should be ›reframed‹ — in other 
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words that one should ask »Is it possible, in regard to the issues in contention, to 
move from a ›win–lose‹ to a ›win–win‹ configuration?«8 (see Fig. 1) 
 
Fig. 1:  Comparison between Two Approaches to Third-Party Intervention in Ethnopolitical 
Conflicts 
 
Phases and elements Issue-based mediation Relation-based 
consultation 
1. Preparation/ establishing 
contact  
Official level, choice by 
position 
Unofficial level, choice by 
function 
2. Type of contact with third 
party; primary role of 
third party 
Concentration on direction 
of the procedure,  conduct 
geared to matter at issue 
and goals 
Also direction of the 
procedure,  but could be 
combined with training 
sessions, therapy-style 
activities, encounter 
sessions, joint projects 
3. How conflict is described 
and diagnosed 
Confined as far as possible 
to a small number of topics 
Wide-ranging ›conflict 
mapping‹ as part of clari-
fication of relations 
4. Main emphases in 
reflection on 
conflict/reframing  
Contextual conditions, clari-
fication of interests: from 
superficial, short term ›po-
sitions‹ to deeper, longer-
term ›interests‹ 
Previous history, acknow-
ledgement of basic needs 
and fears, sounding out-
common ground, predict-
ing the course of the con-
flict 
5. Goal aimed at Practical agreement on how 
to resolve conflict, at least 
›non-paper‹ agreement on 
possible methods of re-
solving conflict 
Improvement in relations, 
increased readiness to take 
part in bi-/trilateral at-
tempts at mediation 
6. Typical applications ›Mediation‹ according to 
Harvard School rules 
Problem-solving work-
shops 
 
                                                          
8. This approach became best known in the version presented in the Harvard Law School’s ‘Program 
on Negotiation. See Roger Fisher, Elizabeth Kopelman, and Andrea Kupfer-Schneider, Beyond 
Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, (Cambridge, Mass. et al., 1994).  
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By comparison with this, the field of application and target groups of relation-
based consultation-procedures are quite a lot broader, because all the individuals 
affected by the conflict can, in principle, take part in them. Very often, elements of 
this kind of third-party involvement are combined with other forms of constructive 
action aimed at influencing the conflict. These include: training sessions in methods 
of communication, negotiation, and mediation; the organization of programmes of 
encounter and exchange; the initiation of bi- or multi-ethnic projects designed to 
improve shared living-conditions, and so on (see Fig. 1). In academic circles working 
on this approach, it is the ‘problem-solving workshop’ that has become the best-
known form, probably because in such workshops, the role of the third party has up 
to now been assumed primarily by academics. Such workshops involve a group of 
influential representatives of each party to the conflict being invited to a series of 
seminars of a half academic/analytical, half sensitivity-based kind.9 
The consultation approach itself, and its importance in constructively 
transforming conflicts, are subjects of dispute. As I see it, experience with third-
party intervention would seem to indicate that the two approaches should be 
regarded as complementary.10 The comparative advantages of the consultation 
approach are: that it can be set in motion even in phases where negotiations 
between the official leadership-groups are blocked; that an ever-larger group of 
open-minded potential negotiators can be mobilized with its help; and that forums 
can be created in which more deeply seated conflicts can be dealt with and in which 
new options for co-operation can be explored without loss of face by political 
leaders. 
The combined impact of different actors and approaches in ethnopolitical 
conflict management has yet to be systematically investigated. An initial 
descriptive-cum-analytical overview has been provided by John Paul Lederach.11 For 
                                                          
9. See Herbert C. Kelman: Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner, in Jacob Bercovitch and 
Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.): Mediation in International Relations, (London, 1992), 64–95.  
10. A view first put forward by Ronald J. Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly in: Third Party Interventions in 
Intergroup Conflict: Consultation is not Mediation, Negotiation Journal, 4 (1988), 381–93.  
11. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, paper submitted to the UN 
University Tokyo, Nov. 1994.  
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pragmatic reasons, Lederach distinguishes three categories — top and middle-
range leadership and influential individuals at the grassroots level — and then 
ascribes characteristic forms of conflict management to each (see Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2: Pyramid of Levels of Involvement in Ethnopolitical Conflict Management, after John 
Paul Lederach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the Lederach scheme, issue-based mediation is directed 
primarily at the top leadership, whereas relation-based approaches are a matter 
chiefly for the medium-range and lower levels. The question of what strategies of 
action result from this will be examined in greater detail below. To begin with, 
however, we need to take a look at the framework conditions and dynamics of the 
conflict. 
 
TYPES OF ACTORS 
Level 1: Top leadership 
 
• Military / political leaders 
with high visibility 
 
 
 
Level 2: Middle Range 
Leaders 
 
• Leaders respected in 
sectors 
• Ethnic/religious leaders 
• Academic/intellectuals 
• Humanitarian leaders 
(NGOs) 
 
Level 3: Grassroots leaders 
 
• Local leaders 
• Leaders of indigenous 
Ngos 
• Community developers 
• Local health officials 
• Refugee camp-leaders 
APPROACHES TO 
BUILDING PEACE 
 
• Focus on high-level 
negotiations 
• Emphasis on 
ceasefire 
• Led by highly visible 
single personality 
 
• Problem-solving 
workshops 
• Training in conflict 
resolution 
• Peace commissions 
• Insider-partial teams 
 
 
 
 
 
• Local peace 
commissions 
• Grassroots training 
• Prejudice reduction 
• Psychosocial work in 
post-war trauma 
FEW 
MANY 
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3 Process-based and Structure-based Intervention 
 
 
 
 
A realistic assessment of the possibilities and limits of peaceful intervention in 
ethnopolitical conflicts cannot be made without consideration of the structural 
framework-conditions in which such conflicts are rooted and which crucially affect 
the way they proceed. Of course, each of these conflicts has its own history, and as 
a rule that history is influenced by a complex collection of diverse factors. None the 
less, a number of common structural points can be discerned, which are decisive in 
driving the escalation forward.12 The two chief ones are, first, massive difficulties 
with, if not the complete breakdown of, socio-economic modernization, and, 
secondly, attempts made by ruling groups to favour individual ethnic groups to the 
detriment of others in the process of political integration and social development. 
One of the prime requirements in regard to constructive intervention by third 
parties must therefore be that such parties should help bring about a massive 
improvement in the economic framework-conditions in the transforming and 
developing societies of this world. Development is one of the crucial preconditions 
for peace; this observation is now common currency in almost all programmatic 
declarations of intent at the international level.13 But the global assertion ›peace 
through development‹ is of little help in planning concrete measures of support in 
situations threatened with an escalation of conflict. Furthermore, many (trans-
itional) development strategies propagate a kind of social differentiation that 
harbours considerable explosive potential in social terms. 
                                                          
12. See the overview in Donald L. Horowitz: Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley et al., 1985), and Ted 
Robert Gurr: Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict, (Washington DC, 1993).  
13. On this, see the close links between conflict management and the Agenda for  Deve lopment  in 
the latest report of the Secretary-General on the work of the UN: UN General Assembly, 51st 
session, New York, Aug. 1996.  
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One important task both for development and peace research and for 
corresponding practical action is therefore to work out more precisely which 
strategies of development co-operation, which economic programmes, and which 
conditions for stabilization imposed by foreign or international institutions have 
which effects on the particular country’s tendency to conflictual behaviour. Up to 
now, this question has been posed primarily from a standpoint that postdates 
military confrontation — in other words, in the form: How can a war economy be 
transformed into a peace economy?14 It would be a good thing if the connection 
between economic development and the capacity for peace appeared on the 
agenda at an earlier stage. And finally, as regards external third parties’ options for 
action, one is also talking here about negative and positive sanctions as a means of 
influencing the dynamics of the conflict. 
The second task in regard to influencing the structural framework-conditions 
of ethnopolitical conflicts is that of altering forms of governance from exclusive to 
inclusive political systems and from power-sharing set-ups that impose homo-
geneity to those that accept heterogeneity. Only in this way will there be any chance 
of bringing about permanent changes in major causes or aggravators of conflict 
such as: the denial of basic needs in regard to the preservation and development of 
cultural identity; the exclusion of the possibility of political co- and self-
determination; insistence on the supremacy of central-government authorities 
against regional concerns and interests; and, under certain circumstances, actual 
threats to the existence of a particular group. 
Permanent peace-making therefore cannot escape having to tackle the 
fundamental conflict of goals between state sovereignty, the right of peoples to 
self-determination, and the international imperative to intervene in order to 
safeguard human rights.15 A possible solution to this conflict of goals is to have 
                                                          
14. See Tobias Debiel: Von der Kriegs- zur Friedenswirtschaft: Kosten des Krieges und 
sozialökonomische Bedingungen der Friedenskonsolidierung, in Volker Matthies (ed.): Vom Krieg 
zum Frieden: Kriegsbeendigung und Friedenskonsolidierung, (Bremen, 1995), 58–82.  
15. See Günther Bächler: Gewaltfreie Regelung von Minderheitenkonflikten durch Föderalismus? Die 
Basle r  Char ta  als Diskussiongrundlage, in Friedensbericht 1996: Theorie und Praxis ziviler 
Konfliktbearbeitung. 1. Jahrbuch für Konfliktlösung, (Zurich, 1996), 279–88.  
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territorially based federal state structures or other forms of power-sharing  which 
envisage either gradations of territorial autonomy or non-territorial participation by 
the ethnopolitical groups that make up the state. In extreme cases and under 
certain conditions, even secession should not be excluded as a constructive form of 
conflict management. Third parties can, on the one hand, assist the implementation 
of these models in concrete individual cases — for example, within the framework 
of OSCE long-term missions, by recommending the elaboration of constitutions with 
strong federal elements. On the other hand, they are also faced with the challenge 
— particularly if they are multilateral institutions — of promoting regime-formation 
in the domain of the protection of minorities. 
When one takes into account the two structural aspects of constructive 
ethnopolitical conflict management, it is clear that third-party interventions must be 
viewed in a considerably broader context than that of ad hoc  reaction to crisis 
situations. It is therefore a good idea to classify the different approaches to conflict 
intervention according, amongst other things, as to whether they are process-
oriented — i.e. seek to exert a direct influence on the actual course of a conflict —
or whether they strive to bring about structural  changes — i.e. a change in the 
institutional framework-conditions in which the conflict is played out. If one 
combines this division with a classification of each third party as belonging either to 
the world of states or to the societal world, what emerges is a four-field scheme of 
constructive conflict interventions (see Fig. 3).16 
 
                                                          
16. On this division, see Ernst-Otto Czempiel: Weltpolitik im Umbruch: Das internationale System nach 
dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1993).  
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Fig. 3: Approaches to Constructive Conflict Intervention in the World of States and the Soci-
 etal World 
 World of states Societal world 
Process-oriented 
approaches 
• Crisis management 
• Mediation (Track 1) 
• Peace-making 
• Peace-keeping 
• Ad hoc  regulations for 
the protection of 
minorities 
 
• Peace-building  
• Consultation (Track 2)  
• Civilian Peace-keeping 
Structure-related 
approaches 
• Legal embodiment of 
protection of minorities 
• Regime-formation for the 
protection of minorities 
• Power sharing 
• Autonomy  
• Federalism 
 
 
Macro-political peace 
building: 
• Creation of ›peace 
constituencies‹ and a 
›culture of peace‹ 
• Promotion of multi-ethnic 
structures and loyalties 
 
 
This very rough grid can do only partial justice to the complexities of the real 
situation, with its multifarious overlaps between the world of states and the societal 
world, and its fluid transitions from repeated ad hoc  interventions to structural 
changes. Nonetheless, I do think it useful as a means of underlining the thesis that 
if conflict management is to be durable, one has to press for measures or changes 
in al l  four f ields . I have already pointed out why this is necessary for the field of 
structural reform in the world of states: only when there is a fundamental 
acknowledgement of the basic need of all ethnopolitical groups for security, 
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identity, and participation, and only when that acknowledgement is implemented in 
a corresponding institutional form, will lasting peace-making be achieved. 
That said, institutionalized acknowledgement is not sufficient of itself  to 
ensure that this goal is achieved: a one-sided implementation of that acknowledge-
ment harbours the danger of a prolongation and intensification of the ethnopolitical 
differences. Measures for bridging these differences, and putting them into 
perspective, are therefore also crucial. These include, in the world of states, the 
parallel reinforcement of the idea of a civic political identity, and also systems of 
power-sharing that contain incentives to form coalitions across ethnic boundaries.17 
However, most of the options for reinforcing multi-ethnic or trans-ethnic loyalties 
and affinities are located in the societal world: successful processes of 
modernization clearly ultimately lead to socialization along criteria other than 
ethnic ones. But for the actors of the societal world, the question arises of how, 
precisely under the conditions of transition, such processes can be fostered. 
This question is easiest to answer at the micro-level, because the core of 
many peace-building measures lies precisely in the formation of links, in exchanges, 
and in encounters between members of the feuding groups. But this approach 
cannot simply be generalized, particularly in divided societies, in which even 
superficial contact with the other side prompts accusations of betrayal. The creation 
of a pan-societal ›culture of peace‹, as propagated recently by UNESCO, can 
therefore only occur at the end of a long process of changes in attitudes, collective 
identities, and institutions.18 An interim step along this path could be the 
establishment of peace constituencies  (see below). 
Finally, it has once again to be stressed that, despite all the structural 
similarities, each conflict is unique, and that, as a consequence, there cannot be 
any macro-political patent remedies. This needs to be particularly emphasized in 
                                                          
17. One example of this is cr oss-vot in g , which enables split voting-populations in divided societies 
to have a say about the composition of political representation in the other part of the country. See 
Leo Tindemans et al.: Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, 
(Washington DC, 1996), 164.  
18. See David Adams (ed.): UNESCO and a Culture of Peace: Promoting a Global Movement, (Paris, 
1995).  
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regard to those disputes that are escalated to a crucial degree by single-minded 
and consciously calculated measures on the part of ruling groups. In these cases —
particularly where violence, which has a fatal momentum of its own, is involved —
crisis management and power-based intervention are often the only remaining 
›constructive‹ forms of intervention. 
 
 
 
 
4 Partiality and Impartiality: A Continuum 
 
 
 
 
The traditional model of third-party participation in conflict management treats the 
parties in dispute as more or less homogeneous actors. This model scarcely does 
justice to the reality of ethnopolitical conflicts: for one thing, ethnic groups are 
often conglomerations which have the appearance of single unified ›parties‹ only by 
virtue of their subjectively determined classification according to particular 
attitudes and types of behaviour. For another thing, in ethnopolitical conflicts, there 
is, as a rule, a more or less broad spectrum of political-cum-social groupings on all 
sides, each representing different interim or mixed positions in regard to the 
conflict. 
The view — widespread in the classical literature on conflict — that escal-
ation brings with it unification and centralization within the affected groups has to 
be modified in relation to the complex situation in many ethnopolitically divided 
societies.19 Even though radical parties and leadership groups seek to exploit this 
effect for their own purposes, there are countervailing forces as well. These may 
include, for example, all those individuals who have bi-ethnic or multi-ethnic 
                                                          
19. For the older literature, see Georg Simmel: Soziologie (ch. 4: Der Streit), (Leipzig, 1908), 310, and 
Lewis A. Coser: Theorie sozialer Konflikte, (Neuwied, 1972), 101–31. 
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loyalties, whether by virtue of origin, mobility, or family ties. Also included are all 
other non-ethnic interest-groups and coalitions in professional and regional walks 
of life and in various cultural and religious milieux. 
In acute ethnopolitical conflicts in particular, vehement disagreements within 
the same ›camp‹ about the way in which the conflict should be conducted with the 
other side are not unusual — as has been the case, for example, in Israel, from the 
time the Rabin and Perez governments decided on a course of rapprochement  
with the PLO. Given these conditions, there is much to support the thesis that a 
lasting peace between the Israelis and Palestinians will only come about when each 
side has also been reconciled with itself. 
In investigating the significance of the (im)partiality aspect, I shall here 
consider, for the sake of simplicity, only three levels of actors: partial, semi-partial, 
and impartial.20 The partial  actors are, as a rule, the political leaderships — in 
other words, the governments and the topmost members of the political groups 
involved. As soon as a conflict begins to be conducted militarily, the weight often 
shifts from the civilian to the military leaders, or the whole leadership-stratum is 
militarized. In a broader sense, this partial group may include all those persons who 
largely identify with the relevant ethnopolitical concerns and goals. 
The semi-partial  actors do not constitute a clearly definable group of 
political parties and social movements. The term implies to all those actors who, on 
ethnic grounds, can be ascribed more to one side or the other, but in whose self-
image ethnopolitical issues play only a secondary role. In acute conflicts, this group 
finds it extremely difficult to secure a hearing. This category often also includes 
interest-groups of a more economic or social bent. 
Impartial  actors either do not figure at all, or do so only to a limited extent, 
within ethnopolitically divided societies. If ethnic membership is not automatically 
viewed as an expression of partiality, then this group is reduced to those 
individuals who have bi-ethnic or multi-ethnic affiliations, and to members of third 
                                                          
20. See Diana Francis and Norbert Ropers: Die Vielfalt der Aufgaben: Zur Friedensarbeit ziviler Akteure 
in nach-kommunistischen Gesellschaften, in Hanne-Margret Birckenbach et al. (eds.), Jahrbuch 
Frieden 1997 (Munich, 1996), 31–50.  
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ethnic groups within the country concerned. However, there are some persons and 
institutions who explicitly distance themselves from this blanket inclusion and put 
the emphasis on other aspects of political identity-formation. The group to which 
impartiality is most readily conceded is that of external  actors , both at the state 
and societal level. 
Constructive conflict management depends on the combined impact of all 
these groups of actors. Two foci are discernible here: first, the direct conflict 
management between and with the partial actors; and secondly, the indirect conflict 
management = relativization of the conflict through reinforcement of the semi-
partial actors. In both cases, impartial actors can play an important role. However, 
their influence is often crucially dependent on outside support, particularly when it 
is a matter of assuming the role of an active third party. 
Against this background, the widespread notion that peace work is primarily 
a task for the least ›partial‹ is highly misleading. It is much more a matter of finding 
constructive routes to conflict management even, and above all, within partial roles. 
The specific nature of these routes depends not only on the concrete configuration 
of the conflict, but also, and in particular, on the phase the conflict has reached. 
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5 Approaches to Intervention in the Course of a Conflict 
 
 
 
 
One of the bestknown models for generalizing the course which conflicts follow is 
the concept of the ladder of escalation. According to this, a sustained conflict has a 
built-in tendency to stage-by-stage intensification. A systematic model for this 
concept has been developed by Friedrich Glasl, who distinguishes nine levels of 
escalation ranging from a ›hardening‹ phase to a »together into the abyss« phase.21 
Applying the model to the course of ethnopolitical conflicts, Ronald J. Fisher and 
Loraleigh Keashly have reduced the number of levels to four: discussion, 
polarization, ›segregation‹, and destruction.22 In the view of these authors, the 
particular stage of escalation reached is crucial in determining the the nature which 
intervention must take to be successful. Their basic rule here is: the greater the 
escalation of the conflict, the more directive and intensive the intervention must be 
to be effective. 
However plausible this rule may seem as a basic model for conflict 
intervention, it does make two assumptions that are problematic when it comes to 
ethnopolitical disputes, namely: relative homogeneity amongst the actors, and 
clearly distinguishable chronological phases in the escalation.23 The problems 
posed by the assumption of homogeneity have already been mentioned when 
dealing with the aspect of (im)partiality. Partly related to this is the difficulty of 
                                                          
21. Friedrich Glasl: Konfliktmanagement: Ein Handbuch für Führungskräfte und Berater, (Bern and 
Stuttgart, 1990), 215 ff. One should, however, also add that Glasl developed this model primarily for 
use in meso-social conflicts.  
22. Ronald J. Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly: The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and 
Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention, Journal of Peace Research, 28 
(1991), 1: 29–42.  
23. On this point, see the contrastive analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict in David Bloomfield: 
Towards Complementarity in Conflict Management: Resolution and Settlement in Northern Ireland, 
Journal of Peace Research, 32 (1995), 2: 151–64.  
  22 
clearly distinguishing the phases of escalation for the totality of the actors involved: 
the current phase on the ladder of escalation can be viewed differently by the 
actors, depending on their bias, with the result that, at a given moment, there are 
often several escalatory phases co-existing in a single area of conflict. 
As far as comprehensive analysis and practical intervention in areas of 
ethnopolitical tension are concerned, the linear model of the ladder of escalation 
displays another weakness: it only comes into operation at the point at which both 
sides have constituted themselves as possible parties to a conflict. But many 
conflicts of this type cannot be understood without reference to their previous 
history, in which, because of the presence of clear but unarticulated injustices, one 
can only speak of a latent conflict. This phase has direct consequences for the role 
and function of the third party, because, at this early stage, the latter is faced 
primarily with a challenge to be ›partial‹. In fact, in cases of extreme discrimination 
and disadvantage, an arrangement between the parties to the dispute can in most 
cases only be reached if the conflict is laid bare and the party with the upper hand is 
confronted with the concerns of the disadvantaged side. 
Diana Francis’s diagram for this kind of conflict-transformation (Fig. 4) 
highlights the need for the subordinate side to be empowered in the latent and 
extremely asymmetrical phase of a conflict. In her confl ict  resolution  box, 
Francis also highlights the fact that, although this task is of central importance in 
the transformation of the conflict, it is only one of several methods of direct support 
and community building . The various steps which she distinguishes in the 
›conflict resolution‹ field correspond to the major elements in the mediation and 
consultation approaches mentioned above.  
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 Fig. 4: Diana Francis/Guus Meijer:Power and Conflict Resolution, typescript 1995.  
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In order to be able to identify the roles and functions of third parties in the 
course of a conflict, it is helpful to distinguish them according to the number of 
persons affected and the level of leadership involved. With this in mind, Figure 5 
picks up on Lederach’s three-part pyramidal scheme. An additional fourth level is 
included, at which third parties can become involved without having a specific 
social group in view. This mainly involves the monitoring of human rights, lobby 
work for disadvantaged groups, and activities that help shape the structural 
framework-conditions mentioned above. The phases of the conflict are summarized 
in extremely simplified form in four and a half stages. 
In the first phase, which extends from latency of the confl ict  to 
polit ical  crisis , a dual strategy is needed. On the one hand, the disadvantaged 
groups need to be bolstered. This task extends from economic assistance, through 
education and training projects, up to an including consultation about, and 
assistance with, the development of suitable forms of political representation of 
interests. A current example of this phase is the situation of the Roma in many 
European countries. On the other hand, the majority group’s own long-term interest 
in maintaining thriving relations with the minority or minorities needs to be 
promoted, and common structures and loyalties need to be reinforced. In this early 
phase of prevention,  measures by social actors positioned below the top level of 
leadership can set important signposts for the constructive management of a 
conflict — by creating a range of institutions for dealing with the ›nitty-gritty‹ of the 
dissension and by training individuals for these kinds of tasks. 
Where there is talk of prevention, this almost always means intervention 
during the second phase, where the conduct of the conflict is already 
confrontational . This is traditionally also the phase in which mediation and 
consultation projects are initiated, in which training and further training in methods 
of conflict management are conducted, and in which peace commissions are given 
institutional form. Given the dynamics of the escalating forces, however, these 
approaches often come too late, affect only a small circle of — already open-minded 
— people with international contacts, and are far too inadequately geared to 
effecting the lasting mobilization of the semi-partial and impartial actors on the 
ground. 
 25 
The point in the escalation of the conflict that is most fraught with conse-quences is 
the transition to the third phase — that of the violent conduct of the confl ict . 
At a stroke, there are numerous additional motives for the conflict.
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  Many who have previously refused to be drawn into the friend/foe schema 
are now forced into polarized positions; those in possession of military power 
acquire increasing control over the dynamics of the conflict, and the civil forces 
withdraw into the background. At this point, the peace work done by civil actors is 
aimed chiefly at bringing the violence to an end, either by exerting direct influence 
on the warring parties, by engaging in public-awareness work and organizing 
protest meetings, and occasionally also by mounting spectacular non-violent 
actions in the war-zones  In practice, however, it is humanitarian help for the victims 
of the war that occupies centre-stage, together with attempts to contain violence at 
local level or to maintain contact across front lines. Direct work on the underlying 
conflict, meanwhile, diminishes in importance — even though it can, in the form of 
shuttle diplomacy and pre-negotiations, undoubtedly play a major role in preparing 
the ground for a cease-fire or a (provisional) peace-agreement.24 
In many areas of tension, the fourth phase — that of post-war confl ict  
management — is, tragically, the first in which any attempt is made to deal with 
the underlying conflict in any other way than through power politics or with threat 
and counter-threat. The tasks that have to be tackled are correspondingly huge.25 In 
addition to the enormous tasks of working out a durable political solution, of 
rebuilding the fabric of the country, and of adapting to a peace economy, there are 
also the difficult issues of the (re)integration of refugees, war victims, and 
combatants, and of the whole complex of problems relating to reconciliation 
between the parties to the war. The major challenges here are, first, that of 
weighing up dissociative against associative principles in (re)building local 
communities, and, secondly, that of working through the past at both the individual 
and collective level. 
                                                          
24. Humanitarian intervention has now become an independent field of research and practice, in which 
a lively discussion is being conducted about the pros and cons of various forms of 
in te rvent ion ism . See the overview in Tobias Debiel and Franz Nuscheler (eds.): Der neue 
Interventionismus: Humanitäre Einmischung zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit (Bonn, 1996).  
25. See e.g. Matthies (fn. 15); also Winrich Kühne: Winning the Peace: Concept and Lessons Learned of 
Post-conflict Peacebuilding, (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: Ebenhausen, 1996).  
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6 Third Parties as Catalysts in the Development of ›Peace 
Constituencies‹ 
 
 
 
 
The roles and functions of third parties as outlined so far may be summarized under 
the following heads: 
 
First : The idea that ethnopolitical conflicts can be peacefully settled primarily 
or solely by means of a reactive outside intervention aimed at leadership groups is 
illusory. What is generally needed, rather, is both a change in the structural 
framework-conditions and a comprehensive mobilization of actors from the political 
and social domains in the affected region, in favour of an active transformation of 
the conflict. 
 
Second: In many, if not most, ethnopolitical conflicts, making a durable 
peace is only possible if, in addition to the conflicts of interest being settled, the 
conflicts in relations are also dealt with. Most political third parties, but also many 
social ones, are overtaxed with this second task. In view of these demands, the 
institutions and repertoire of conflict management should be thoroughly discussed 
and expanded. 
 
Third:  Given the character of ethnicity, with its tendency, in principle, to lead 
to group formation, one needs, when engaging in the constructive treatment of 
ethnopolitical disputes, to adopt a dual strategy. On the one hand, one has 
expressly to acknowledge the plurality of ethnic traits as a basic form of 
socialization and a basic expression of collective identity-needs. On the other hand, 
one needs to promote non-ethnic traits and citizen-based loyalties and reinforce 
their institutional foundations. 
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Fourth:  The notion, implicit in the concept of the third party, that the latter’s 
partners in the area of conflict are more or less homogenous ›partial‹ actors, is not 
only far too simplistic; it can also be counterproductive, because it may weaken 
precisely those whose reinforcement is crucial — namely, the semi-partial and 
impartial groups on the ground. The concepts of ›impartiality‹ and ›neutrality‹ also 
merit investigation: taken per se  and as static entities, they are of little use. The 
decisive factor, rather, is that third parties should have or acquire the skill to 
develop procedures and forums for conflict management that are acceptable to 
both sides, and the skill to adapt to the changing framework-conditions.26 
 
Fifth:  One cannot stress often enough how much of an impact preventive 
intervention has on the way in which ethnopolitical conflict is conducted. However, 
one has to admit that, up to now, only rudimentary research has been done into the 
radical consequences which an imperative such as this has for the whole field of 
international relations.27 
 
The secretary-general of International Alert , Kumar Rupesinghe, suggests 
the term ›strategic alliances‹ to describe the combined impact of different actors in 
the transformation of ethnopolitical conflicts.28 He is picking up on usage of this 
term in the globalized economy to underline the fact that, where there is a huge 
weight of problems, even influential actors will not be able to achieve any 
movement unless they combine forces through task-sharing, and pursue 
                                                          
26. See Frank Liebe: Intercultural Mediation: A Difficult Brokerage: An Empirical-Analytical Attempt to 
Assess the Impact of Cultural Differences, (Berghof Report 2; Berlin 1996).  
27. See Volker Mathies: Vom reaktiven Krisenmanagement zur präventiven Konfliktbearbeitung, aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B. 33–4/1996, 19–28; also Tobias Debiel: Gewaltprävention in 
innerstaatlichen Konflikten: Mögliche Konzepte für neue Herausforderungen, (Arbeitsstelle 
Friedensforschung: Bonn, 1996).  
28. See Kumar Rupesinghe: Transformation innerstaatlicher Konflikte: Von den ›Problemlösungs-
Workshops‹ zu Friedensallianzen, in Ropers and Debiel (fn. 6), 304–20; also Rupesinghe (ed.): 
Conflict Transformation, (Houndsmills: London, 1995).  
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complementary strategies. This applies also and especially to ›protracted conflicts‹ 
in the ethnopolitical field. 
In addition to this, the combined impact of external third parties and internal 
actors should be organized such that — as Lederach has put it — peace 
constituencies  emerge on the ground.29 The term implies networks of individuals 
who, firstly, have a personal interest in the lasting settlement of ethnopolitical 
conflicts, and, secondly, have the influence and skills to be able to make this 
interest a reality. 
The term ›peace constituencies‹ is a back-reference to ›war constituencies‹, 
i.e. those social and economic structures that take shape within the affected society 
in the course of a lengthy military altercation and which — often independently of 
the original causes of the war — foster the continuation of the violence. Such 
constituencies include, most importantly, the immediate ›winners‹ in the militarized 
conditions — arms manufacturers and dealers, the army or the various armed 
militias, the ›security services‹ of varying provenance, the political ›hardliners‹, and 
also the beneficiaries of the redistribution of land, capital, and political posts, at 
least for as long as their gains do not seem permanently secured. In the wider 
sense, however, war constituencies also include those who have profited from the 
more or less improvised ›war economy‹ and all those who exploit the shattered 
structures and corrupt conditions in order to engage in illegal dealings. Finally, a 
long-lasting ›culture of violence‹ also changes the nature of civilian intercourse 
within the affected social groups, and the individual finds it ever more difficult to 
oppose the spread of violence and the hardening of social relations. 
Creating ›peace constituencies‹ accordingly means lending support, within 
post-war societies, to interests, networks, institutions, and attitudes of an opposite 
kind to those just cited. From the point of view of prevention, the aim must be to 
win over a broad-based network of multifarious social forces to the idea of 
transforming the conflict. In this connection, Lederach puts the main stress on the 
                                                          
29. John Paul Lederach: Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a 
Comprehensive Framework, in Rupesinghe (ed.) (fn. 28), 201–22. See also Lederach: Preparing for 
Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures, (Syracuse, 1995).  
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mobilization of the potential for peaceful conflict-regulation that already exists in 
the particular society or region, and has its roots in traditional culture. This is 
undoubtedly one possible contribution; but because the dynamics of many 
ethnopolitical conflicts is determined precisely by changes in these cultures 
dictated by modernization, one also has to create new  structures and processes of 
conflict management. 
Third parties can play an important role here, by helping the actors on the 
ground to extend their horizons and to accept the fact that there is ultimately no 
getting round the need to acknowledge  the fundamental change in situation 
brought about by the ethnopolitical conflict. Often, the parties to the conflict, even 
though they do not admit this officially, are hoping that the conflict — or, more 
precisely, the position of the opposing side — will ›somehow‹ disappear at some 
point or another. This leads on to the last heading under which the roles and 
functions of third parties may be summarized. 
 
Sixth:  External third parties have a special responsibility for creating local 
and regional ›peace constituencies‹ in crisis areas. They make resources available, 
pass on know-how, provide forums for exchanges and network-formation, as well as 
for direct conflict management, and they not infrequently act as ›models‹ for 
desirable changes on the ground. Of course, their success is to be measured not in 
terms of these — often impressive — individual measures, but in terms of whether 
their »helping hand to self-help« leads to the creation of a lasting basis for peace on 
the ground. In general, this requires long-term commitment. 
 
